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Balancing habitual and deliberate forms of choice entails a comparison of their respective merits—the former being faster
but inflexible, and the latter slower but more versatile. Here, we show that arbitration between these two forms of control
can be derived from first principles within an Active Inference scheme. We illustrate our arguments with simulations that
reproduce rodent spatial decisions in T-mazes. In this context, deliberation has been associated with vicarious trial and error
(VTE) behavior (i.e., the fact that rodents sometimes stop at decision points as if deliberating between choice alternatives),
whose neurophysiological correlates are “forward sweeps” of hippocampal place cells in the arms of the maze under con-
sideration. Crucially, forward sweeps arise early in learning and disappear shortly after, marking a transition from delib-
erative to habitual choice. Our simulations show that this transition emerges as the optimal solution to the trade-off
between policies that maximize reward or extrinsic value (habitual policies) and those that also consider the epistemic
value of exploratory behavior (deliberative or epistemic policies)—the latter requiring VTE and the retrieval of episodic
information via forward sweeps. We thus offer a novel perspective on the optimality principles that engender forward
sweeps and VTE, and on their role on deliberate choice.
Substantial evidence indicates that animal behavior is determined
both by deliberative processes (i.e., based on predictions of future
outcomes and rewards) and by habitual reflexes (i.e., based on
stimulus–response associations; Balleine and Dickinson 1998).
The former are more resource intensive and sensitive to changes
in task contingencies, while the latter are cheaper but inflexible;
hence whether it is optimal to call on deliberative or habitual
choice depends on the trade-off between the advantage of flexi-
bility and computational costs (Balleine and Dickinson 1998;
Dolan andDayan2013; Lee et al. 2014). In this paper, we try to un-
derstand the contextualization of behavior and the trade-off
between deliberative and habitual choice from first principles, us-
ing Active Inference and Markov decision process models of
exploitation and exploration (Friston et al. 2013, 2014, 2015;
Pezzulo et al. 2015).
We focus specifically on vicarious trial and error (VTE) behav-
ior, which is considered a hallmark of deliberation (Muenzinger
1938; Tolman 1938, 1939). This is based on the observation that,
when rodents have to remember or search the correct route to a re-
ward in a maze (e.g., a T-maze), they sometimes stop at choice
points, to look left and right before choosing which direction to
go. This has been interpreted as a signature of cognitive search
and deliberation between the two choices (i.e., going right or
left). In keeping with a role of VTE behavior for deliberation, it oc-
curs early in learning and decreases or disappears after significant
experience (Tolman 1939; van der Meer and Redish 2010; van der
Meer et al. 2012) but it can increase againwhen task contingencies
change (Blumenthal et al. 2011; Schmidt et al. 2013; Regier et al.
2015). VTE behavior has been consistently linked to hippocampal
function (Hu and Amsel 1995; Voss et al. 2011; Regier et al. 2015).
During deliberative choice and VTE, electrophysiological mea-
surements of the hippocampus show that activation in place cells,
which usually code for the current position of the animal, sweeps
forward by recruiting first cells that code for one branch of the
maze, and then cells coding for the other, thus transiently (and
serially) coding for possible future routes. Simultaneously, covert
expectations of rewards can be measured in the ventral striatum
(Johnson et al. 2007; Johnson and Redish 2007; van der Meer
et al. 2012). The hippocampus–ventral striatum pathway might
represent a neurophysiological mechanism for VTE-based spatial
deliberation and search processes, where memories of past experi-
ences, associated with each choice, are recalled—or future events
are simulated based on episodic memories—and used off-line to
update the subjective value of the subsequent choice and select
among plans (Lansink et al. 2009; van der Meer and Redish
2010; Pennartz et al. 2011; Pezzulo et al. 2013, 2014).
In sum, VTE behavior and associated hippocampal forward
sweeps have been linked to deliberation and the (covert) evalua-
tion of choice alternatives. They are an ideal paradigm for study-
ing the various trade-offs between habitual and deliberate forms
of choice. Indeed, their disappearance after a few trials, when
the animals become familiar with the task contingencies, poten-
tially marks a transition from deliberative to habitual forms of
choice; and their reappearance when task contingencies change
potentiallymarks the opposite transition fromhabitual to deliber-
ative strategies. Most current models link VTE behavior to a form
of model-based search among alternatives, but diverge in the spe-
cific mechanisms. For example, if VTE is involved in the calcula-
tion of value of the alternatives (“value-of-alternatives” theory)
it should increase when the options are more difficult to differen-
tiate. Alternatively, if VTE is responsible for flexible changes of
strategies (“flexibility” theory), it should increase when behavior
needs to be more flexible to achieve outcomes, see Pezzulo et al.
(2013) and Regier et al. (2015) for discussions of these and related
theoretical proposals. Here we advance a novel view that implies
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VTE behavior and associated forward sweeps in the (optimal) sol-
ution of the trade-offs between deliberate and habitual choice,
which arise under various levels of extrinsic value, epistemic val-
ue, and uncertainty.
In a series of previous papers, we have described a Bayesian
formulation of foraging behavior, known as Active Inference
(Friston et al. 2015), in which agents maximize simultaneously
“extrinsic value” (e.g., expected reward) and “epistemic value”
(e.g., information gain or the resolution of uncertainty implicit
in exploration or curiosity).4 In this paper, we use this Active
Inference scheme to consider an important empirical phenome-
non underlying VTE behavior; namely, the interruption of ongo-
ing behavior to perform an epistemic action—the retrieval (or
construction) of episodic memories through internal rehearsal
(or simulation). Within this framework, we illustrate why this
VTE processing disappears as the agent (e.g., rat) becomesmore fa-
miliar with the task contingencies. Our formulation enables us to
reduce VTE and its properties to the normative principles Active
Inference, thus formalizing the computational mechanisms and
functions of VTE.
We start from the idea that behavior can be controlled in dif-
ferent “modes,” habitual or deliberate, which we associate here
to policies that follow stereotyped patterns to maximize reward
or extrinsic value (habitual policies) versus those that also consid-
er the epistemic value of exploratory behavior and thus perform
epistemic actions (deliberative or epistemic policies)—the latter
requiring VTE and the retrieval of episodic information via for-
ward sweeps. More specifically, here forward sweeps constitute
an “internalized (epistemic) action” that retrieves episodic
memories, and uses them in a constructive manner to mentally
simulate future (expected) episodes, analogous to constructive ep-
isodicmemory processes in humans (Schacter et al. 2007;Hassabis
andMaguire 2009; Buckner 2010). In keeping, here wemodel for-
ward sweeps as covert (mnemonic/constructive) actions that are
treated in exactly the sameway as overt epistemic actions (e.g., ex-
ploratory actions), except that they sample cues or outcomes from
memory and not the external environment. Importantly, in this
formulation forward sweeps can become an explicit component
of a policy or sequence of behaviors—hence the term “epistemic
policies” for those policies that include forward sweeps. This
means the agent has to evaluate policies that are mixtures of
actions, some of which are covert (episodic retrieval) and others
that are expressed overtly through moving to a new location.
This formulation creates the interesting problem of balancing
the epistemic value of covert mnemonic retrieval of construction,
against the pragmatic value of securing a reward in the shortest
possible time, that is, a subtle form of the exploration–exploita-
tion dilemma (see the Discussion for a clarification of the links
between “internal or covert” and “external or overt” exploration
processes).
We will discuss how the (Bayes-optimal) scheme used here
can be adopted to interpret two different forms of memory classi-
cally separated in the literature; namely, procedural and episodic
memories. These two forms of memory correspond to different
mechanismswithin the proposed framework. Indeed, in the infer-
ential scheme used below, “posterior beliefs” about the context or
current environment (e.g., reward locations in a maze) become
“prior beliefs” for the next round of exploration—or in other
words, an agent can accumulate knowledge about its environ-
ment (e.g., reward location) in a series of trials and use this knowl-
edge in the next trials. This form of (Bayesian) belief updating
(between trials or sequences of behavior) can be conceived as an
implicit or “procedural” form of memory—in terms of the evi-
dence accumulated for one particular context relative to another,
which in animal behavior links to (slowly) accumulated neocorti-
cal changes (McClelland et al. 1995) and to the gradual formation
of action chains and habits in dorsolateral striatal areas (Graybiel
2008). With repeated exposure to the same environment, agents
become increasingly confident about the best policies and—based
on their acquired procedural knowledge—are able to engage in
exploitative behaviors more efficiently and can “transfer” control
to habitual processes. This contrasts with the initial exposure
to the environment, when confidence about contingencies is
low. It is in this case that search processes and episodic memo-
ries—associated with hippocampal functioning (Tulving 1972;
Eichenbaum 2000)—may play an essential role, see Lengyel and
Dayan (2008) for a discussion of the advantages of episodic con-
trol over other forms of control when an agent only has limited
experience. We assume here that episodic memories concern
the outcome experienced on the previous trial(s) and are used to
construct or simulate future episodes on the fly (Hassabis and
Maguire 2009), that is, when the agent is deliberating “within” tri-
als—although experiences can also be “replayed” “between” trials
for learning purposes and beyond (Sutton 1990; Diba and Buzsa´ki
2007; Pezzulo et al. 2014).
At the neurobiological level, we associate this process with
hippocampal forward sweeps (Johnson and Redish 2007; van
der Meer and Redish 2010; Pezzulo et al. 2014). Our primary ques-
tion was whether the interplay between implicit (procedural) and
explicit (episodic) memory could explain the disappearance
of simulated forward sweeps that is seen empirically when rats
become more confident with the contingencies of their environ-
ment. Heuristically, one can imagine that retrieving past out-
comes (episodic memories) has epistemic value, which more
than compensates for the delay in reward delivery (due to VTE
and deliberation time) and the (putative) cognitive cost of episod-
ic constructions. However, this will only be the case when there is
a relatively high degree of uncertainty about reward locations or
the current context. As experience with a particular environment
is accumulated (through implicit or procedural memory) the epi-
stemic value of episodic retrievalwill decline. Thiswould suggest a
subsequent decrease of “covert” epistemic actions (associated
with episodic memory retrieval and VTE behavior) and a gradual
passage from a deliberate to a habitual mode of behavior.
To sum up, the novelty of this proposal is that we associate
VTE behavior andhippocampal sweeps to (internalized) epistemic
actions that can be part of the animal’s behavioral plan. At deci-
sion points, candidate plans (policies) are evaluated and those
that include VTE behavior (epistemic policies) are preferred
when epistemic value prevails over extrinsic value. In this perspec-
tive, a transition from deliberate to habitual choice emerges as the
optimal solution to the trade-off between policies that maximize
reward or extrinsic value (habitual policies) and those that also
consider the epistemic value of exploratory behavior (deliberative
or epistemic policies)—the latter requiring VTE and the retrieval
of episodic information via forward sweeps.
The proposed theorymakes the prediction that VTE behavior
depends on balance between epistemic and extrinsic value during
a choice. In turn, epistemic value has amultidimensional sensitiv-
ity to uncertainty about the choice context (e.g., the reward con-
tingencies) and the demands of behavioral flexibility (e.g., the
need to track context changes to secure a reward). Thus, forward
sweeps at decision points should be curtailed as an agent becomes
more confident about the task contingencies (as in these occa-
sions a stereotyped, habitual policy is sufficient), and be reinstated
(for example) when task contingencies change and behavior
needs to be flexible to adapt to the novel contingencies.
5Formally, this process corresponds to the minimization of (expected) free
energy, i.e., a mathematical quantity, not to be confused with an animal’s
metabolic resources, see Friston (2010).
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This aligns our proposal with flexibility theory of VTE (Regier et al.
2015) but links the proximal mechanisms of flexibility to episte-
mic policies, which in turn depends on the (increased) epistemic
value of a choice situation. By highlighting a role of epistemic
value in engendering VTE, our novel proposal can generate addi-
tional predictions. For example, epistemic value is key in so-called
“costly” choices, when an accurate estimation of the context
is necessary to secure a reward and a wrong choice implies a
“cost” such as long delay in reward consumption (van der Meer
et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2012), less so in conditions in which ex-
trinsic value is plentiful and exploration redundant—and it is in
the former, not the latter situations that VTE behavior should be
observed.
To test this set of hypotheses, we performed simulations in a
T-maze and a multiarm radial maze in which one arm was baited.
We equipped agents with the prior belief that they were in amild-
ly volatile environment in which the maze (reward location)
could change—and then allowed it to explore themaze over mul-
tiple trials (with occasional changes in the reward location). This
prior belief is implemented by including in the agent’s internal
model a (small) expected probability that the context will change
after each trial, see Table 1. Because the agent expects a degree of
volatility a priori, its implicit (procedural) memory, due to
Bayesian belief updating between trials, has residual uncertainty,
especially in the early trials. By endowing agentswith policies that
include covert actions (episodic retrieval), we hypothesized a re-
solution of this uncertainty during early exploratory behavior
that called upon forward sweeps to retrieve episodic memories.
Furthermore, we hypothesized a resurgence of VTE behavior and
forward sweeps in situations that require more flexibility, such
as when contingencies change. Crucially, these are all emergent
behaviors under ideal Bayesian assumptions—or in other words
they emerge as optimal solution when an agent tries to maximize
extrinsic and epistemic value and needs to rationally arbitrate be-
tween them.
Results: VTE simulations using Active Inference
This section describes four simulations of VTE behavior using a
Bayesian (Active Inference) formulation of choice and foraging
(Friston et al. 2013, 2014, 2015). Our hope was to reproduce
VTE behavior (and its neurophysiological underpinnings)—and
then test the hypothesis that VTE-like processingwould disappear
as the simulated agents became familiar with the contingencies of
the task at hand.
Themathematical methods used for
the simulations are provided in the
Materials and Methods section. Here, it
is sufficient to say that the task of the
agent is to select among a series of
sequential policies (p), comprising ac-
tion sequences such as: “go right, then
go right,” “go left, then go left,” “per-
form VTE, then go right,” and so on. To
this aim, the (Q) values of these policies
are calculated, by summing their “extrin-
sic value” (i.e., the expected reward they
deliver) and “epistemic value” (i.e., the
information gain associated to its ac-
tions) over time points in the future.
Formally, this (Q) value corresponds to
the expected (negative) free energy of a
policy, at any point in the future, as given
by the following equation (for a full der-
ivation of the equation, please see Friston
et al. (2015):
Qt(p) = EQ(ot,st |p)[lnP(ot, st|p) − lnQ(st|p)]
= EQ(ot,st |p)[lnQ(st|ot,p) + lnP(ot|m) − lnQ(st|p)]
= EQ(ot |p)[lnP(ot|m)]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Extrinsic value
+EQ(ot |p)[D[Q(st|ot,p)||Q(st|p)]]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Epistemicvalue
.
(1)
Intuitively, the Q value of a policy sums up the value of all the
observations that the agent (should) gather by following the
policy from start to end—including most prominently reward
observations (note that, in our simulations, all the policies have
the same length). Mechanistically, it is calculated by starting
from the agent’s belief about its present state (which can be uncer-
tain), by propagating predictions about future states that are
expected to be visited given the policy, and by considering the
value of the outcomes that can be (probabilistically) obtained in
these states.
This evaluation, in turn, requires equipping the agent with
three types of a priori knowledge: a generative model (m) of the
task, which essentially encodes the contingencies between the ac-
tions prescribed by the policies and the resulting states (s) and ob-
servations (o); beliefs about the agent’s current state; and beliefs
about the extrinsic value of the goal (rewarding) state(s).
The evaluation assigns policies a value depending on two
components that—as we will see—need to be balanced: extrinsic
value and epistemic value. The extrinsic value corresponds to
delivering rewarding outcomes, e.g., a rewarded branch of a
T-maze. In this Bayesian formulation, the animal’s goals and
needs are expressed in terms of prior probabilities or preferences
for particular (rewarded) outcomes, and policies that minimize
(in probabilistic terms) the distance5 between the current state
and the goal states (i.e., states in which the preferred outcomes
can be obtained) have thus high extrinsic value.
However, the evaluation also considers the epistemic value
or information gain furnished by new information that disam-
biguates among hidden states (e.g., the location of an unseen
reward). In this perspective, a policy that permits an agent to
Table 1. Parameters used in the simulations
First
simulation
Second
simulation
Third
simulation
Fourth
simulation
Prior on rewarding state(s) (i.e., value
of reward)
2 2 2 2 and 4
Prior on incorrect state (i.e., cost
of wrong choice)
22 22 22 22
Prior on imaginary states (i.e., cost
of imaginary action)
20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1
Probability of observing the red
cue (i.e., obtaining reward) if
the correct action is executed
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Probability of observing the correct
(blue or green) cue when an
imaginary action is executed
0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
a 64 64 64 64
b 4 4 4 4
l 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
(Belief about) the probability
of changing context
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
6Formally, the probabilistic distance between the actually sensed outcomes
and the (rewarded) outcomes expected under the prior probability can be
encoded as a “surprisal” (or surprise); and for this, the minimization of sur-
prisal is valuable (i.e., zero surprisal means that the animal is in the goal
state). Note that this is a technical use of the notion of surprisal and it
does not always correspond to the commonsense use of “surprise.”
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estimate in which choice context it is (i.e., what are the task
contingencies) has high epistemic value. Of note, all the policies
that we will use in the simulations have some epistemic value,
because obtaining (or not obtaining) a reward is per se informative
about choice context. However, some policies also include epi-
stemic actions that correspond here to a covert retrieval of episod-
ic memory and VTE behavior. Selecting policies that include
epistemic actions and VTE has short-term costs (e.g., might delay
reward acquisition) but can also have long-term advantages. Our
simulations will show in which cases policies that include, or
not include, epistemic actions are preferred.
Once the agent has calculated the (Q) value of the policies ac-
cording to Equation 1, it selects one using a precision-controlled
softmax rule (i.e., a choice rule that assigns policies a probability
to be selected proportional to theirQ value, and includes a param-
eter that regulates exploration depending on the estimated reli-
ability or precision of the policies, see later). The agent then
executes the current action prescribed by the sequential policy,
does a transition to a new state, samples probabilistically the ob-
servation available in this state (e.g., a reward observation), and
based on this observation updates its belief on its current state
and context. At this point, the evaluation starts again, in order
to select the second action to take, and so on; this implies that
an agent can start acting based on a given policy, and then select
a new policy along the way based on the new observations it ob-
tains. See Materials and Methods for further details.
Summary of the four simulations
The setups (T-mazes and radial mazes) used in the four simula-
tions are shown in Figure 1. In the first stimulation, we address
the choice between two branches of a T-maze, one of which is re-
warded, of the kind where evidence on vicarious trial and error
(VTE) and forward sweeps has been recently reported (Johnson
and Redish 2007; van der Meer and Redish 2010; Pezzulo et al.
2014). In this simulation, the rat is uncertain about two possible
contingencies (i.e., whether the reward location is to the right
or left), which—in terms of the agent’s model—correspond to
two hidden contexts. In this setting, we will see that the rat per-
formsVTE behavior—but only in the initial trials, until uncertain-
ty about the context resolves with experience, thus making a
transition from a deliberate (VTE) to a more habitual form of
choice.Wewill also see that, when the task contingency (aka con-
text) changes, VTE behavior is reinstated, suggesting that it (only)
plays a role when the animal’s behavior needs to be flexible.
In the second simulation, we use amazewith three branches.
Here, there are three possible contingencies (or contexts), corre-
sponding to finding rewards to the left, central, or right branch
of the maze. While in the first simulation sampling either branch
is equally informative about the current context, in the radial
maze the rat has to “probe” each branch individually—or more
precisely, all but one branch—to infer the context it is in.
In the third simulation, we model a more complex decision
situation: a double T-maze, with two consecutive decision points
(this is similar to the setup of van derMeer et al. 2010; Gupta et al.
2012, but includes two rather than four decision points). The first
decision point is often referred to as “easy choice,” while the last
choice is considered to be a “costly choice”—and it is only in these
“costly” decision points that VTEs are observed (van der Meer
et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2012). What makes the early decision
points “easy” is the fact that the animal can easily and quickly re-
cover from a wrong choice; in our simulations, these decision
points do not lead to absorbing states and so even if the animal se-
lects the wrong branch, it can successively select a policy that
leads to reward. What makes the last decision point “costly” is
the fact that awrong choice in this pointwould significantly delay
reward consumption, because basically the animal has to come
back to the home location of themaze anddo all the choices again
before having the chance of obtaining a reward. In our simula-
tions, (only) costly decision points mark transitions to absorbing
states, and so if an animal selects the wrong branch it cannot ob-
tain reward in this trial.
In the fourth simulation, we return to the maze with two
branches of the first simulation, but expand the number of
task contingencies (or contexts) by introducing scenarios
in which the reward can be in both locations, but one branch de-
livers more reward (or with a higher probability)—thus introduc-
ing a choice between a high versus low-reward choice. This
simulation highlights the context-sensitivity of VTE behavior
and its alleged dependence on the relative extrinsic and epistemic
reward.
In summary, these simulations are intended to illustrate the
role of VTE and epistemic actions in a normative model of forag-
ing, and the ways they change depending on the task contingen-
cies and experience.
First simulation: a simple T-maze simulation
Setup
The scenario that we consider in our first simulation is a T-maze
with two branches; see Figure 1A. The goal of the agent is to
find a reward site, which can be to the left or right, depending
on the context (which is initially set to “reward to the left,” but
changes during the simulation). The agent has to select among
multiple policies, some of which go directly to the right or left
(which are absorbing states), whereas others include some forward
sweeps, followed by overt movement to the right or left.
The agent is initially uncertain about the context: after each
choice, procedural knowledge (of the task contingencies) is updat-
ed in a Bayesian manner (Friston et al. 2013, 2014, 2015), so that
the rat becomes increasingly confident about its choices. At the
same time,we endowed the agentwith the prior belief that the en-
vironment is volatile and can change (with a small, fixed probabil-
ity); this is essential for the agent to update its belief about the
context (reward location) when, as we will see below, we change
it during the experiment.
Figure 1. Setups of the four simulations. (A) First simulation, with two
branches. (B) Second simulation, with three branches. (C) Third simula-
tion, with two consecutive choices, easy and costly. This example shows
a sample configuration that corresponds to the right–left context,
where the path to the left is blocked. The other three possible maze con-
figurations are left– left, left–right, and right–right. (D) Fourth simulation,
with two branches, which can be associated to high, normal or no reward.
Active Inference and vicarious trial and error
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The generative model
The agent’s generative model is shown in Figure 2. It includes 10
“hidden states” (5 locations × 2 contexts) and 20 “observations”
(5 locations × 4 cues or stimuli). The two contexts correspond
to the two reward contingencies: “reward is on the left” or “reward
is on the right.” The five location states correspond to three loca-
tions of themaze (center or start location, left arm, and right arm)
plus two additional “imaginary” or mnemonic locations that cor-
respond to episodic memories of the right or left arm. Visiting
these “imaginary” locations does not correspond to an overt phys-
ical action but to a covert and deliberative VTE event; i.e., a for-
ward sweep to the right or to the left, respectively. Here, we
treat these imaginary locations as hidden states (by analogy
with real spatial locations) because, technically, the animal can
decide whether or not to “visit” them covertly. The transitions
along the hidden states are controlled by five control states, which
effectively move the rat to each of the five locations, within
each context. Finally, the model includes four outcomes or cues:
red (reward), white (neutral), blue and green (contextual cues
which correspond to the episodic recall of a reward outcome on
visiting a given branch of the maze); see also Friston et al.
(2015). As in many animal experiments, all these cues are deliv-
ered probabilistically. The reward cue is delivered 75% of the
time in the correct branch of the maze (otherwise, the mutual
cue is delivered). Similarly, the correct contextual (blue or green)
cue is delivered 85% of the times in the corresponding context
(otherwise the alternative contextual cue is provided). In other
words, even if the rat is certain about the reward location, its re-
trieval is imperfect.
It is important to note that, by visiting a state, the agent col-
lects cues or observations that can help disambiguate the context
it is in. For example, if it visits a “left” control state and collects a
red cue (reward), it can infer that it is in a context where “reward is
delivered to the left.” By accumulating this information, the agent
can successively choose “left” with higher confidence. This marks
an important difference with associative learning theories,
because—in Active Inference—behavior is not selected based on
(learned) stimulus–response or action–outcome associations,
but rather through a (Bayesian) inference that selects policies
based on beliefs about context (see Equation 1).
A second important point to note is that, in this scenario, vis-
iting an “imaginary” state corresponds to performing VTE (and
implicit forward sweeps) to a given branch. During this covert
behavior the agent remembers or simulates a previous reinforcing
(or neutral) episode; i.e., it covertly retrieves from memory (or
simulates) experiencing one of the two contextual cues (blue or
green). This form of episodicmemory or simulation is not consid-
ered here to be a rewarding experience per se—on the contrary, we
associate states that are “visited” during VTE with a small prior
cost (e.g., the cost of forward sweeps in terms of time and cogni-
tive resources). In the Active Inference framework, costs (e.g., cog-
nitive and metabolic costs) are absorbed into the probability
model (Friston et al. 2012b); this means that costly states (here,
imaginary states) have an a priori lowprobability in the generative
model and thus—all other things being equal—are less likely to be
visited. However, there are circumstances when this prior cost is
more than offset by the value of reaffirming the current context,
before committing to a choice. In other words, here VTE and for-
ward sweeps have a cost in terms of extrinsic value, but have epi-
stemic value as they afford new information (blue or green cues)
that can inform state (context) estimation and future choices.
This formulation thus allows us to compare policies that lead
the animal directly to rewards (which we associate with habitual
forms of choice) and policies that firstly exploit epistemic actions
and “imaginary” states (which we associ-
ate with deliberative forms of choice and
covert exploration).
Simulation
The simulation was integrated over 20
trials. The agent starts from the center
(home) location. Initially (in trial 1) the
agent has a flat (uninformative) prior be-
lief about the context or reward location;
this belief is updated as described in
Friston et al. (2015). On each trial, the
agent has to select one of its policies
based on its beliefs about context, knowl-
edge of the task contingencies (as en-
coded in the generative model that
links hidden states to observations).
This selection is effectively an inference
about sequential policies that maximize
(the path integral of) value that is based
upon prior preferences or utility.
In Active Inference, utilities are en-
coded in terms of Bayesian “priors” over
future outcomes, and the agent believes
that the most likely policies minimize
the divergence between expected and
preferred states, encoded in these priors.
These priors are usually specified in terms
of log probabilities or utility. Intuitively,
positive utility corresponds to reward,
while negative values correspond to
cost. In this simulation, the correct (re-
warding) arm of the maze is assigned a
Figure 2. Generative model used in the first simulation, which includes control states, hidden states,
and observations, along with their contingencies. The symbol ⊗ denotes a Kronecker tensor product.
See main text for explanation.
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high utility, the wrong (unrewarding) arm of the maze is assigned
an equivalent negative utility, and the imaginary states are as-
signed small negative values, so that there is a cost for performing
forward sweeps. See Table 1 for the value of the parameters used in
this and subsequent simulations.
The policies selected by the agent comprise sequences of
three control states, and can include either “real” control states
(e.g., go to the left arm), which lead the agent to absorbing hidden
states (i.e., once the animal has reached the left arm, it can only
select another “left arm” control state) or “imaginary” control
states (i.e., remember going to the left arm), which lead the agent
to hidden states that are not absorbing. Here, for simplicity, we
consider 14 possible policies. These include one “imaginary” con-
trol state (e.g., simulate going left, then go left), two “imaginary”
control states (e.g., simulate going left, simulate going right, then
go right), or no imaginary control states (e.g., go left).
Selecting one or two “imaginary”
actions or control states (i.e., performing
one or two forward sweeps) enables the
agent to recall one or two episodes, and
thus garner more (mnemonic) cues for
committing to a choice. At the same
time, performing forward sweeps has a
cost for the animal, because it implies a
delay in reward consumption and/or
the expenditure of metabolic or cogni-
tive resources. In the model, this cost is
encoded as a (small) negative utility asso-
ciated to the imaginary hidden states
(which translates into a lower probability
in the generativemodel). The interesting
comparison here is between the policies
that do and do not include, “imaginary”
actions, as the former correspond to VTE
and the execution of forward sweeps.
Results
The results of the first simulation are
shown in Figure 3.Here, we show the per-
formance of the rat (black), its uncertain-
ty (red) and the number of VTE forward
sweeps, over 20 trials. The results shown
here and in the following simulations
are an average over 1000 runs of the
same model. Note that, although the
model is always initialized in the same
way, policy selection and the sampling
of outcomes are stochastic processes.
Figure 3A shows the performance
(i.e., rewards collected) and uncertainty
of the agent over the 20 trials. Figure 3B
shows thenumber of times that the agent
uses a policy with one ormore imaginary
actions or forward sweeps. The agent
only uses VTE in the first trials, and stops
doing so after few trials, marking a transi-
tion from deliberative VTE to a more ha-
bitual form of choice. Here, the preferred
policies are those that include a single
forward sweep (compare with the sec-
ond simulation below). During trial 11,
we inverted the context (i.e., the reward
contingencies), from “reward to the
left” to “reward to the right.” It is at this
point that the agent’s performance sud-
denly decreases, because it acts on the basis of a false belief. In
turn, this failure causes a second transition, from habitual to
deliberative choice, as at the next trial, the agent starts using
VTE again.
This behavior can be further analyzed by considering the be-
lief about the reward context, which is shown in a black-to-white
(low-to-high) scale in Figure 3C. After just one trial, the agent be-
comes very confident about its context. The belief becomes more
uncertain after the tenth trial, but only transiently, when the
agent realizes that the context has changed.
Discussion
In this first simulation, we replicated the experimental finding
that rodents engaged in T-mazes use VTE/forward sweeps in the
first few trials only, and then exhibit a more habitual form of
Figure 3. Results of the first simulation. (A) Performance (black) and uncertainty (red) in the 20 ex-
perimental trials. Performance is measured as the percentage of correct responses, with the dashed hor-
izontal line representing the highest possible performance. Uncertainty represents the agent’s
uncertainty about the current context. (B) VTE events, shown as the percentage of selected policies
that include imaginary actions/forward sweeps (blue). See main text for explanation. (C) Agent’s
belief on its current context (white is high, black is low).
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behavior. Furthermore, VTE/forward sweeps can be reinstantiated
by changing the reward contingencies (Johnson and Redish 2007;
van der Meer et al. 2012; Schmidt et al. 2013; Pezzulo et al. 2014).
In our simulations, changing the model parameters makes these
transitions faster or slower in terms of number of trials that in-
volve or do not involve VTE, but not the overall pattern of results
(results not shown).
Crucially, we have replicated these results by appealing only
to Bayesian inference, not a set of stimulus–response or action–
reward associations. This Bayesian perspective provides a norma-
tive explanation for the balance of information gain and utility
maximization—that is, exploration–exploitation (Friston et al.
2015). It suggests that the balance of different choice strategies,
deliberative or habitual, can be explained in terms of normative
principles; specifically, as the utility of extrinsic rewards relative
to epistemic value provided by covert action or deliberation.
Only when there is nomore epistemic value (e.g., because the an-
imal has resolved its uncertainty about the current context) can
forward sweeps be suppressed.
By the same token, we show that the balance between delib-
erative and habitual choice strategies can be cast within a single
Active Inference scheme, which supports epistemic actions. This
view can be comparedwith alternative schemes based onmultiple
controllers that operate using different (model free and model
based) reinforcement learning principles and require an external
arbitrator (Daw et al. 2005; O’Doherty et al. 2015). Here, the key
point is that Active Inference simultaneously considers two
forms of value: extrinsic value and epistemic value. It is when
the former surpasses the latter that behavior can be habitized.
Policies that try to maximize directly extrinsic value using stereo-
typed responses and without performing epistemic (or explorato-
ry) actions can be considered more habitual. These are indeed
successful when the environment is unambiguous—or, in other
words, familiar environmental cues or the animal’s current belief
state unambiguously specify the best policy. When this is not the
case, epistemic actions (here, covert samples of episodic infor-
mation from memory) must be performed before committing
to a course of action. Empirically, it is only in these latter con-
ditions—which we associate to deliberative choice—that VTE
behavior and forward sweeps are observed. This simulation illus-
trates that forward sweeps are indeed executed in the initial trials,
or when contingencies change; that is, when the agent is uncer-
tain about its current context and behavior needs to be flexible
to secure a reward.
In short, all the behavior simulated under active inference is
quintessentially model based. The key distinction between delib-
erative and habitual responses can then be reduced to a distinc-
tion between policies that entail epistemic actions and policies
that do not. Here we link epistemic actions to a form of “mental”
exploration, in which episodic content is retrieved frommemory
(Eichenbaum 2000; Tulving 1972) or simulated/recombined in a
constructive way to construct novel episodes (Hassabis and
Maguire 2009; Schacter and Addis 2007), thus leaving open the
possibility that VTE-based declarative control engages a mixture
of model based and episodic components. In turn, the episodic
component can include a mixture of contextual, spatial, and re-
ward information (e.g., through reactivations of hippocampus
and ventral striatum, Lansink et al. 2009). The engagement of ep-
istemic behavior does not require any special arbitration; it is a
natural consequence of casting the utility of a reward in terms
of a prior belief, which enables it to be compared directly with
the epistemic value of (overt and covert) exploratory behavior.
This is a key simplification afforded by Active Inference, enabling
habitual and deliberative planning to be treated within the same
normative framework and, potentially, implemented within the
same distributed neuronal systems.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the reason the agent
changes its belief (rapidly), when contingencies change, is that
we endowed it with the prior belief that the reward contingencies
are volatile—and can change from one trial to another, although
with a small probability. By removing the volatility prior, a trained
agent would be less sensitive to changing contingencies. This idea
resonates with related Bayesian theories of foraging and learning,
in which animalsmake their choices based on the (learned) statis-
tics of the environment, including higher order statistics such as
volatility (Gallistel 2012). In this perspective, animals learn and
track the statistics of the environment, at multiple levels, to adapt
their behavior and learning rates in efficient ways (Gershman and
Niv 2012; Gallistel and Matzel 2013; Pezzulo et al. 2013).
Second simulation: radial mazes and resolution
of uncertainty
Setup
One limitation of the simulations above is that there are only two
possible contexts, and so collecting the cue of (say) “no reward to
the left” automatically implies “reward to the right.” This is also
why the agent only performs one sweep (Figure 3B), when delib-
erating. To make things more realistic, we now describe a second
simulation, where the agent navigates amazewith three arms (see
Fig. 1B). The possibility of three mutually exclusive contexts (re-
ward to the right, center or left arm) means that probing each
branch of the maze will necessarily increase epistemic value.
The generative model
The generativemodel used in this second simulationwas the same
as in the first, except that there are three rather than two contexts,
and two additional control states: one additional true location,
which corresponds to the third arm of themaze, and the associat-
ed imaginary location. The ensuingmodel thus comprises 21 hid-
den states (7 locations × 3 contexts). As in the first simulation,
there are 4 cues, but now the number of possible observations is
28 (7 locations × 4 outcomes). As in the first simulation, the red
cue (reward) can be (probabilistically) collected in only one of
the arms, while the other two arms deliver white (neutral) cues.
The “imaginary visit” of the three branches delivers a blue or a
green cue, which correspond to the episodic recall of a rewarding
or a neutral outcome.
In this simulation, we considered 48 policies, comprising se-
quences of four control states. As in the first simulation, here the
interesting comparison is between policies that lead the agent
directly to one of the three arms of themaze (which are absorbing
states), and those inwhich the agent engages in one ormore imag-
inary actions.
Simulation
The simulations covered 30 trials, where we changed the reward
contingencies (and context) at trials 11 and 21. As in the first sim-
ulation, the agent always starts from the center (home) location
with uninformative prior belief about the context (reward loca-
tion), which is successively updated over successive trials.
Results
The results of the second simulation are shown in Figure 4. One
can see that the same pattern of behavior emerges, with an initial
rapid decrease of the VTE/forward sweeps marking the passage
from deliberate to habitual forms of choice, and the reinstantia-
tion of a deliberative strategy, when reward contingencies change.
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Discussion
The analysis of context belief updating (Fig. 4C) confirms that the
agent infers the right choice context correctly and rapidly, and
then stops performing forward sweeps. A fine-grained analysis of
the policies implying forward sweeps (Fig. 4B) shows that VTE is
never completely extinguished, but declines rapidly. Further-
more, this analysis shows a preference for policies with one, or
at most two, imaginary actions.
The same overall pattern of results can be obtained with dif-
ferent parameterizations of themodel (results not shown). In par-
ticular, the partial or complete extinction of forward sweeps
depends on the relative balance between extrinsic and epistemic
value in each setup—this is a point thatwe consider inmore detail
in the next two simulations.
Third simulation: easy versus costly choice
Setup
The scenario that we consider is a double
T-maze, with two consecutive decision
points; see Figure 1C. In principle, there
are four possible paths (left–left, left–
right, right–left, right–right); however,
a barrier located after the first decision
point blocks two of them. Importantly,
a wrong decision in the first (easy) but
not the second (costly) decision point
can be undone, by selecting an appropri-
ate policy. This is because only the states
accessible from the second decision point
are absorbing.
A similar setup (but with up to four
decision points) has been adopted in a se-
ries of rodent studies (van der Meer et al.
2010; Gupta et al. 2012). Using the termi-
nology of these studies, here we consider
the first decision point to be an “easy
choice” and the second decision point a
“costly choice”—because a wrong choice
at this latter point would significantly de-
lay reward consumption (i.e., the animal
has to traverse all the maze, come back to
the home location, and start a new trial
in order to get the chance again to obtain
a reward).
The generative model
The generative model used in this third
simulation was similar to the first, but
there are four rather than two contexts,
corresponding to the four choice possibil-
ities (left–left, left–right, right–left,
right–right) to be executed. Furthermore,
there are 11 control states: one for each of
the three possible decision points (in-
deed, a first, easy decision point is fol-
lowed by one of two costly decision
points, one on the left or one on the
right), six imaginary states (two for each
decision point, the former imaging the
consequences of going left and the latter
the consequences of going right) and
two final states (the left return arm and
the right return arm). The ensuingmodel
thus comprises 44 hidden states (11
locations × 4 contexts). We introduced six contextual cues. As in
the first simulation, the reward cue can be (probabilistically)
collected in only one of the arms, while the other arm delivers
(probabilistically) a neutral cue. The “imaginary visit” of the two
branches of the costly choice delivers a blue or a green cue, which
correspond to the episodic recall of a rewarding or a neutral out-
come. The “imaginary visit” of the twobranches of the easy choice
delivers two distinct cues, yellow and black, which signal that the
agent is in one of two contexts (yellow: left–left, left–right; black:
right–left, right–right), thus partially reducing its uncertainty.
As we have mentioned, a first difference between the former
(easy) and the latter (costly) decision is that states accessed from
the latter (but not the former) decision point are absorbing. A sec-
ond difference between the former (easy) and the latter (costly)
decision is that, in our setup, performing imaginary actions in
the former does not provide contextual cues that uniquely pre-
scribe the correct behavioral policy. This is because the contextual
Figure 4. Results of the second simulation. (A) Performance (black) and uncertainty (red) in the 30
experimental trials. (B) VTE events, shown as the percentage of selected policies that include imaginary
actions/forward sweeps (blue). See main text for explanation. (C) Agent’s belief on its current context
(white is high, black is low).
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cues that can be obtained (via epistemic actions) in the former de-
cision point inform on the validity of the left versus right actions
at this “easy” decision point, but not on the choice to be made at
the “costly” decision point. This aspect of the model represents
the fact that forward sweeps have limited span. Rather, the con-
textual cues that can be obtained (via epistemic actions) in the lat-
ter decision point function exactly as in the previous simulations.
The convergence of these two factors would improve the util-
ity of performing forward sweeps in the presence of “costly” deci-
sion points, but it remains to be established if this prediction
holds when one simulates the specific experimental details.
Simulation
The simulations covered 40 trials, where we changed the context
(and reward contingencies) at trials 11, 21, and 31. As in the first
two simulations, the agent always starts from the center (home)
location with uninformative prior belief about the context (re-
ward location), which is successively updated over successive
trials. The context is changed every 10
trials using this sequence of contexts:
left–left, left–right, right–left, right–
right. As in the previous simulations, a
critical comparison is between policies
that include or not include VTE events.
Here, however, another critical compari-
son is between policies that include VTE
events at easy versus costly decision
points. Note that for the sake of simplic-
ity we only consider policies that allow
one single VTE event per decision point
(thus, we do not perform a comparison
between policies that include one versus
two VTE events).
Results
The results of the third simulation are
shown in Figure 5. Here, like in the first
two simulations, one can see marked
increases and decreases of the VTE be-
havior/forward sweeps observed at the
beginning of the experiment and when
reward contingencies change. Impor-
tantly, the VTE/forward sweeps are al-
most exclusively present in the “costly”
decision points, see Figure 5B.
Discussion
Coherent with the previous simulations,
here VTE behavior and forward sweeps
mark a transition from deliberate to ha-
bitual forms of choice—and associated
habitual policies—which become avail-
able when the correct choice context
has been estimated. The fact that VTE
events are mostly limited to “costly” de-
cision points is coherent with the litera-
ture (van der Meer et al. 2010; Gupta
et al. 2012) and illustrates that it is at
this point that epistemic actions are
more efficacious to inform the correct
choice and prevent a significant delay
in reward consumption.
The higher peak after trial 21 marks
an important transition between policies
that differ in both the required actions (from left–right to right–
left). Although this situation does not induce higher contextual
uncertainty than the previous transition (from left-right to left-
left), it requires a more flexible change of strategy—as one cannot
keep executing the first (left) action as in the previous case. It is
this case that demands more forward sweeps, in keeping with a
recognized role of VTE behavior in promoting behavioral flexibil-
ity (Papale et al. 2012). Here, the increased number of VTE events
is plausibly due to the fact that, after the first (left) choice, the an-
imal faces the impossibility to pursue its policy—as the path is
blocked. Hence, it is already at this point (after the first decision
point of trial 21) that it knows that context has changed andneeds
to invoke a VTE event to flexibly change policy. This situation can
be contrasted with all the other simulations, in which the agent
cannot infer a change of context midway in a trial (here, trial
21), but only at the end of it, if it fails to collect an expected re-
ward. Supporting this analysis is the fact that, in this simulation,
context changes in trial 21 and VTE events occur mostly in the
same trial; whereas in the other simulations, VTE events occur
Figure 5. Results of the third simulation. (A) Performance (black) and uncertainty (red) in the 40 ex-
perimental trials. (B) VTE events, shown as the percentage of selected policies that include imaginary
actions/forward sweeps in the easy (blue) or costly (green) decision points. (C) Agent’s belief on its
current context (white is high, black is low).
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mostly one trial after context has changed (e.g., context changes
in trial 11 and VTE events occur mostly in trial 12).
The fact that epistemic actions (which in our simulations
have an associated cost) are rarely executed at the first (easy) deci-
sion point indicates that—besides being less informative—they
are not necessarily required whenever uncertainty exists between
alternatives. Rather, they are only demanded when the epistemic
value they afford exceeds the extrinsic value of the overt behavio-
ral policies—or, in otherwords,when awrong choicewould imply
a significant cost or delay in reward consumption. In the latter
simulation we study in more detail this latter phenomenon: the
suppression of VTE behavior and forward sweeps when the value
of the alternative behavioral policies is increased, thus exceeding
any epistemic value.
Fourth simulation: plentiful rewards
Setup and generative model
The fourth simulation introduces a
choice scenario in which one or both
arms of the T-maze are associated to re-
wards. Here, we compare explicitly two
different situations. In the former situa-
tion, analogous to the first simulation,
one branch is baited with reward and
the other corresponds to a nonpreferred
alternative (i.e., the baited arm has a
“value” of 2 and the nonbaited arm of
22). As we have seen, this corresponds
to a “costly” choice situation, in which
making the wrong choice has an asso-
ciated cost that surpasses the costs of
epistemic actions. In the latter case, we
associate rewards to both arms and
make the value of one arm (called “high
reward”) twice the value of the other
(called “usual reward”); see Figure 1C.
We are interested in the comparison be-
tween the former (costly) and the latter
(plentiful) choice situations.
In this simulations, the 5 control
states and the 14 policies are the same
as in the first simulation. However, there
are now four contexts or reward contin-
gencies. The first two are the same as in
the first simulation, when either the
right or the left arm of the maze is re-
warded. The last two correspond to the
context when one arm of the maze (left
or right) delivers the usual reward, while
the other (right or left, respectively) af-
fords a high reward (i.e., double reward).
As wewill see, when these two latter con-
texts are in place, any policy that goes
directly to a rewarded branch (including
the less-rewarded arm of the maze) can
overcome the value of policies that in-
clude VTE and implicit forward sweeps.
Finally, there are six cues. The first four
are the same as in the first simulation,
while the latter two (dark red and dark
blue) correspond to the presence and
the episodic retrieval of the high reward,
respectively, analogous to the red and
blue cues in the first simulation.
Simulations
The simulations covered 40 trials, where we changed the reward
contingencies at trials 10, 20, and 30. The first two contexts intro-
duced in trials 1 and 10 are the same as those used in the first sim-
ulation; however, at trials 20 and 30, we introduced the two new
reward contingencies, in which the two arms of themaze deliver a
normal reward and a high reward. As in the first simulation, the
agent always starts from the starting (center) location with unin-
formative priors.
Results
The results of the fourth simulation are shown in Figure 6.
In the first half of the simulation (trials 1–19), the pattern of
behavior is similar to that of the first simulation, with an initial
use of epistemic policies based on forward sweeps, which are
Figure 6. Results of the fourth simulation. (A) Performance (black), uncertainty (red), and percentage
of selected policies that include imaginary actions/forward sweeps (blue) in the 40 experimental trials.
Note that in this figure there are two dashed horizontal lines, representing the highest possible perfor-
mance in the first half (lower line) and the second half of the simulation (higher line), respectively. (B)
Agent’s belief on its current context (white is high, black is low). (C) Detailed analysis of the policies that
include zero, one, or two forward sweeps.
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rapidly suppressed. Although the choice situation looks identical
to the first simulation, there is an important difference: while in
the first simulation the agent resolved uncertainty over two con-
texts, here it has to consider four contexts, two of which include
rewards in both arms of themaze. Clearly, in this situation the val-
ue of taking overt action soon (versus covert action) is much high-
er, and this explains why the agent uses fewer forward sweeps,
relative to the first simulation.
In the second half of the simulation (trials 20–40), in which
reward is delivered in both arms of the maze, the forward sweeps
are almost completely extinguished. Here, the key insight is that
this pattern does not depend on a resolution of uncertainty
(on the contrary, uncertainty is quite high around trials 30–31).
Rather, the scarce use of forward sweeps is due to the fact that in-
troducing abundant reward lowers the (relative) value of episte-
mic actions, because even an apparently “suboptimal” choice is
more valuable than a forward sweep.
Discussion
The results of this simulation (especially the secondhalf) illustrate
that even if performing a forward sweepwould reduce uncertainty
about the context, the policies that entail forward sweeps have
lower overall value (extrinsic plus epistemic value), even com-
pared with policies that secure a low reward. This is because
they include costly imaginary states, and delay reward delivery.
To better understand this point, and the prevalence of extrinsic
value in this simulation, note that all the policies have a higher
value compared with the simulations above. This is evident in
Figure 5A, which shows that the performance increases in the sec-
ondhalf of the simulation. The reason is, of course, that both arms
are rewarded. The situation here is markedly different from the
first simulation, where the “wrong” armof themaze ismore costly
than imaginary actions.
It is also worth reminding that all policies—including those
that do not include epistemic actions—have some epistemic val-
ue, because visiting any branch of the maze is informative of
the choice context (because the animal collects red or white
cues). Here, again, the choice is between policies that use imagi-
nary actions to retrieve episodic content and policies that try to
maximize extrinsic value directly—and which gain information
only with overt actions. In situations where reward is plentiful,
following a habitual policy that is insensitive to the current con-
text is sufficient; however, despite the fact that the animal does
not explicitly select epistemic or exploratory actions, its habitual
behavior has nevertheless some epistemic or exploratory conse-
quence, permitting the animal to estimate its current context at
least to some extent.
This simulation highlights the fact that the choice of a delib-
erative strategy depends on the balance between extrinsic value
(of the rewards to be collected) and epistemic value (of the possi-
ble states to be visited). In other words, in Active Inference, episte-
mic actions are not mandatory under residual uncertainty or
when the precise value of alternatives remains to be estimated
(as would be the case according to the “value-of-alternatives” the-
ory) but they are preferred when the epistemic value is higher
than the extrinsic value, because both are considered together—
on a level playing field that, as shown in Equation 1, is provided
by expected free energy.
With some simplifications, one can conclude that VTE
behavior/forward sweeps are preferred when the cost of perform-
ing “imaginary” actions is intermediate between the values of the
two branches of the maze. This is consistent with the operational
definition of “costly” choices adopted in many studies of VTE
(Gupta et al. 2010; van der Meer et al. 2010), where choice situa-
tions are costly if selecting the wrong option is significantly worse
(i.e., in terms of delay in reward consumption) than spending
time to decide. Conversely, easy choice situations are those in
which one can undo or quickly recover from a wrong choice. In
addition, our results suggest that themost naturalway to frame in-
teresting choice situations is in terms of relative (not absolute)
utility, and more precisely as the choice between a (potential)
“gain” versus a (potential) “loss,” where the cost of epistemic ac-
tion is intermediate. Not only does this relative value-coding
seems to apply when only one arm of the maze is baited, but
also when both are baited with rewards that are significantly dif-
ferent—say with a smaller versus a greater reward. In this latter
case, the acquisition of the smaller reward might be cast as a
cost, not a gain, and hence encoded as a negative value—for ex-
ample, the difference between the small reward actually acquired
and the greater reward thatmight have been (counterfactually) se-
cured. The fact that rodents show sophisticated forms of regret
(Steiner and Redish 2014) speaks in favor of such a (counterfactu-
ally based) relative value coding. In terms of our simulations, this
would imply that it is appropriate to model both “reward versus
no-reward” and “high- versus low-reward” situations in terms of
a gain and a loss (e.g., 2 versus22). Rather, a value-coding that in-
cludes too many gains (e.g., 2 versus 4) might instead represent a
choice situation in which reward is plentiful and exploration is
not necessary (see Discussion).
More generally, the emergence of VTE in the context of dif-
ferentially rewarded outcomes depends sensitively on the relative
utility (i.e., prior preferences). The key thing to note here is that,
in active inference, the utilities of all outcomes are relative—and
utility has a quantitative meaning in terms of relative (log) prob-
abilities of preferred states (Friston et al. 2015). In other words,
because the prior preference is a probability distribution it has
to sum to one, which means there is no absolute utility, only dif-
ferential utilities. This is an important point, and suggests that it is
the differential utility (prior preference) that determines choice
behavior: this is becoming increasingly evident in neurophysio-
logical and fMRI studies (Rushworth and Behrens 2008). In our
context, the relative nature of utility spans all options—including
VTE. This means that the cost of a VTE could be less than either
reward, in which rewards would usually supervene. Conversely,
the VTE could have a prior preference that was intermediate be-
tween the high and low reward outcomes. In this instance, one
would expect qualitatively different behavior—in the sense that
the cost of VTEmakes it viable in relation to a potentially less pref-
erable reward. This highlights the importance of differential util-
ities in determining behavior, which renders them important
variables in modeling observed behavior and characterizing indi-
viduals on the basis of their choices.
Variants of the fourth simulation, with varying levels of extrinsic value
The fourth simulation has highlighted the fact that VTE behavior
can be abolished in situations when extrinsic value overcomes ep-
istemic value. To characterize more systematically the relation-
ship between extrinsic value and the number of forward sweeps
performed before a choice, we performed a further analysis in
which we varied the amount of reward delivered by the two arms.
Specifically, we considered inmore detail how the number of
forward sweeps varies in trial 31 of the above simulation when we
vary two parameters: the value of the “usual” reward (c) and the
relative value or differential of the “high” reward (called “diff”
in the figure; note that in the fourth simulation the “high” reward
was twice the “usual” reward). This simulation produces a non-
trivial landscape of results. As shown in Figure 7, when the “usual”
reward is higher than a threshold value (here, around 1), the agent
eschews imaginary actions, no matter the number of times the
“high” reward exceeds it, because any policy that goes directly
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to any of the two arms is more valuable than all policies that in-
clude imaginary actions. However, with lower values of the “usu-
al” reward, the agent uses imaginary actions—but only if the
epistemic value (and information gain) associated with context
estimation surpasses the value of the actions that lead to any re-
ward. Specifically, the agent uses imaginary actions only if the
total extrinsic value available is lower than a given value (that
varies depending on c; for example, it is 2 when c is 0). Finally,
the fact that epistemic actions are not always performed when
the differential is zero shows that VTE behavior is not associated
with a putative difficulty in distinguishing amongst similarly val-
ued alternatives, as would be predicted by “value-of-alternatives”
theory.
Another point that is worth noting is that the number of for-
ward sweeps does not necessarily depend on the number of con-
texts to be disambiguated or (the difficulty to disambiguate)
their value. Indeed, in Equation 1 epistemic value depends on
the possible contexts irrespective of their specific extrinsic value.
This illustrates the fact that epistemic and extrinsic value can
be varied independently. Technically, expected free energy is a
linear mixture of epistemic and extrinsic value, meaning that
both sorts of value can be compared directly, see Equation 1.
This explains the switch from deliberative to habitual behavior
when the epistemic value of a deliberative behavior falls below
the extrinsic value of a competing (habitual) policy. Despite so,
the choice to perform or not perform epistemic actions to disam-
biguate context is not insensitive to extrinsic value, as ultimately
in our simulations it is an increased possibility to obtain a high(er)
reward that favors the selection of epistemic (or deliberative) over
habitual policies. This speaks to the importance of epistemic ac-
tion and exploration in the maximization of extrinsic value on
a different timescale.
Discussion
Wehave simulated various choice scenarios, with varying levels of
extrinsic value and epistemic value afforded by uncertainty.
Taken together, these simulations show that both habitual and
deliberate forms of control can be accommodated under the
same Active Inference scheme, where extrinsic and epistemic val-
ues are optimized together. Specifically, the balance between ha-
bitual and deliberate forms of control depends on the relative
extrinsic and epistemic value that is af-
forded to a policy, and do not necessarily
require two separate “controllers,” one
for habitual choice and one for delib-
erate choice (the latter possibly using
hippocampal sweeps) and an external
arbitration mechanism as commonly as-
sumed in reinforcement learning theo-
ries (Daw et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2014;
O’Doherty et al. 2015). One problem
with most “multi-controller” schemes is
that they require the separate controllers
to be always activated in parallel; how-
ever, in this case we would observe for-
ward sweeps (and VTE) in all trials. One
alternative view is that the controllers
can be recruited serially. In this perspec-
tive, the (more demanding) deliberate
processes are only recruited when neces-
sary, for example, depending on the “val-
ue of information” (VoI) (Keramati et al.
2011; Pezzulo et al. 2013). However, to
address the notoriously challenging VoI
computations, one has either to assume that the deliberate system
has “perfect information” about the value of choices at each state
(Keramati et al. 2011) or use approximations (Pezzulo et al. 2013).
In this Active Inference formulation, instead, the epistemic value
of actions (which links directly to VoI computations) is automat-
ically considered by the policy selection mechanism, which arbi-
trates between those that yield, or do not yield, information gain.
By the same token, in the model presented here the distinc-
tion between deliberate to habitual choice does not map one-
to-one to distinct, model-based versus model-free computations.
Here, both can be implemented under the same inferential
scheme, by considering policies that include, or not include, epi-
stemic actions. In other words, VTE behavior is part of a search
process that—importantly—includes epistemic actions and the
recall (or construction) of episodic memories. In keeping with
the idea that deliberate and habitual forms of choice can recruit
partially different brain networks (Balleine and Dickinson 1998;
Yin and Knowlton 2006; Redish 2013), it is only in the former
(deliberate) forms of choice that VTE behavior and hippocampal
forward sweeps are necessary. This is coherent with previous for-
mulations that highlight their importance in deliberative choice
(van der Meer and Redish 2010; van der Meer et al. 2012;
Pezzulo et al. 2014) and with empirical evidence that hippocam-
pal processing is linked to deliberate forms of choice but not—
or not necessarily—habitual forms (Redish 2013; Schmidt et al.
2013) as well as to novel information (Lisman and Otmakhova
2001; Vinogradova 2001).
Our simulations provide a normative perspective onwhy this
is the case. The first and second simulations suggest that deliber-
ate behavior and associated VTE and forward sweeps arise when
(contextual) uncertainty has to be resolved before a choice, and
it is suppressed when information gain is no longer possible (after
uncertainty has been resolved). The third simulation shows that
VTE behavior is key in “costly” choices, whenever a wrong choice
would prevent reward consumption or delay it significantly, but is
not necessarily demanded in the presence of residual uncertainty.
Taken together, the results of the first three simulations link VTE
behavior to behavioral flexibility, and show that while diminish-
ing uncertainty is an important imperative in some cases (first and
second simulation) it is not the primary determinant of epistemic
action. Rather, it is the relative value of extrinsic versus epistemic
value that regulate VTE dynamics. We further investigate this as-
pect in the fourth simulation, which shows that epistemic actions
Figure 7. Number of policies that include forward sweeps during the fourth simulation, trial 31, as a
function of the value of “usual reward” (c) and its differential with “high reward” (diff)—that is, the
number x so that usual reward + x ¼ high reward. Results are for 10,000 runs for each combination
of (c and diff) parameters. See main text for explanation.
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are suppressed when the extrinsic value that can be obtained by
acting overtly (rather than covertly simulating) exceeds informa-
tion gain. This latter result highlights the important role of prior
preferences that, in Active Inference, are a softmax function over
utilities (whichdetermines the relative log probability of eachout-
come). In otherwords, every outcome is associatedwith an extrin-
sic value that is inherently relative to all other available outcomes.
Tomodel a preference for the greater reward, onewould simply in-
crease the differential between the two options until the lesser re-
ward no longer predominated over epistemic value—leading to
the behavior illustrated in the first simulation. Although of course
there are multiple ways to set prior preferences, it is this latter
value-coding, in which (with some simplifications) the value of
epistemic actions is intermediate between the highest and lowest
option,whichwe consider to be themost appropriateway tomod-
el various meaningful choice situations, including choices be-
tween a higher versus a lower reward—where, basically, the
value-coding is relative, not absolute, and the low reward would
be encoded as a loss compared with the other potentially (coun-
terfactually) available reward.
The dependence of epistemic action and exploration on the
overall available (extrinsic) value shows the relations between
our formulation and other normative principles in foraging theo-
ry and exploration-exploitation—and especially the Marginal
Value Theorem. According to the latter, an animal should stay
in (exploit) its patch as long as the current reward rate—the mar-
ginal value of the patch—exceeds the average reward rate of the
environment;when this is not the case, it should leave the current
patch (explore) (Charnov 1976). The formal framework presented
here extends these normative principles from foraging domains to
VTE behavior and hippocampal forward sweeps—where the latter
are assimilated to a form of “mental” exploration. In this perspec-
tive, if a habitual policy—or a policy that is insensitive to the con-
text—provides a high reward rate, the probability of exploring
should lower, unless the agent expects a change of context. This
analogy remains to be fully assessed empirically.
Taken together, our results illustrate that changing environ-
mental properties, such as the balance of extrinsic and epistemic
value, demand different behavioral strategies, which—in the ani-
mal learning literature—correspond to deliberate versus habitual
forms of choice (Balleine and Dickinson 1998; Dolan and Dayan
2013). In the scheme presented here, deliberative mechanisms
are required when behavior needs to remain flexible and alterna-
tives need to be explored, and it is in these conditions that VTE
behavior is present. Habitual strategies emerge instead when the
environment unambiguously specifies the (best) options.
Finally, VTE behavior is also suppressed when the extrinsic value
of any choice exceeds the information gain afforded by epistemic
actions. These results provide a normative account of VTE behav-
ior and forward sweeps that is coherent with existing evidence,
and generate novel empirical predictions that can guide future
research.
The theory presented here is alternative to the idea that VTE
behavior stems from conditioned orienting (Bower 1959; Spence
1960) or discrimination learning (Schrier and Povar 1979). Our
proposal is instead compatible with views that see hippocampal
sweeps (and ventral striatal activations) as part of a model-based
evaluation process (Johnson et al. 2007; van der Meer et al.
2012; Pezzulo et al. 2013; Steiner and Redish 2014), with the
idea of Tolman (1948) that VTE behavior permits learning the
structure of a task and flexibility theory of VTE (Regier et al.
2015). Furthermore, our proposal resonates well with the view
of Johnson et al. (2012) that VTE affords “information foraging”
in memory and, by engaging a model of task contingencies, per-
mits to simulate or imagine potential observations (or informa-
tion that can be sampled). These theories highlight that VTE
plays several roles—in deliberation, behavioral flexibility, struc-
ture learning, information foraging—that in our proposal all
stem from the fact that they afford (covert) epistemic actions.
We offer a formal scheme to calculate the value of epistemic (or
information foraging) actions and compare it with the extrinsic
value afforded by overtly executed actions, thus selecting policies
that include (deliberate) or not include (habitual) epistemic com-
ponents. In this perspective, the distinguishing element of VTE
behavior is the epistemic component that is not mandatory in
model-based search. Furthermore, here we stress the importance
of episodic components, often associated with hippocampal pro-
cessing (Tulving 1972; Eichenbaum 2000), within a model-based
inference scheme.
The formal model we have adopted here can, in principle, be
extended in several ways. For example, we have assumed that the
agent’s generative model includes all the information about task
contingencies, the reliability of the cues, and the number of al-
lowable contexts, which animals must learn. Our assumptions
mimic the situation faced by rodents in T-maze studies, in which
the animals have already learned these probabilistic contingen-
cies (Johnson and Redish 2007; Gupta et al. 2012). However, the
computationalmodel presented here can be easily extended to in-
corporate learning, as part of the Bayesian estimation scheme
(Friston et al. 2015). This extension would permit to model, for
example, the fact that hippocampal theta sequences, which we
consider here as part of the agent’s generative model, are learned
through experience, albeit very rapidly (Feng et al. 2015) and be-
fore that cannot be plausibly used for episodic retrieval or
simulations.
Another limitation of the current model is that we adopt a
simplified method to discount the value of delayed rewards. In
the model, all policies have the same length (say, three actions)
and—for the sake of simplicity—we allow agents that arrive
sooner to a reward site (say, after just two actions) to consume
the rewardmore than once (say, twice, one plus the number of re-
maining actions in the policy). This stems from the fact that re-
ward sites are absorbing and an agent reaching one of them
cannot leave it until the end of the trial. This method permits im-
plicitly discounting the value of a reward for the agents who arrive
at the reward site later, but can be refined to obtain a better (quan-
titative) fit to behavioral data on temporal discounting.
Our simulations also require a notion of “context,” whose
precise characterization in the brain remains to be fully spelled
out. From the perspective of an animal engaged in situated action,
what makes contexts different from one another is not a minor
difference in perceptual features, but plausibly a meaningful
difference in reward delivery—and ultimately a difference in the
action to be taken. In this perspective, the view that every exper-
imental condition (say, 3 pellets versus 1 pellet; 1 pellet versus 0
pellets) necessarily corresponds to one context for the animal ap-
pears to be an oversimplification. For example, animals could
group different experimental conditions into one single context,
if the strategy to be taken is essentially the same. Albeit in a differ-
ent domain, the question of “when to create a new context (or
task set)” has been recently posed in a series of computational
studies that use Bayesian nonparametrics coupled with reward
contingencies (Collins and Koechlin 2012; Collins and Frank
2013; Stoianov et al. 2015; Maisto et al. 2016). It emerges from
these studies that it is often valuable to group contexts in behav-
iorally relevantways, not just according to perceptual similarity of
the items; for example, in such away that a change in context nec-
essarily signals a change in the “rule” to be applied or the strategy
to be followed (Stoianov et al. 2015). In keeping, an animal might
be aware that a change in the environment occurred, but might
mark this event as a change of context only if it implies a change
in behavioral strategy. In turn, thismechanismwould require VTE
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and epistemic action (to infer the new context) only when there is
an associated change in strategy. This hypothesis is in keeping
with evidence that VTE behavior is clearly linked to changes in
behavioral strategy (Regier et al. 2015), but it remains to be fully
tested empirically.
Here, we have associated forward sweeps with the con-
struction or retrieval of episodic information; for example, about
past reward delivery. In the examples above, these are covert or
“imaginary” actions that can be part of a deliberate strategy
and a policy that the animal follows to optimize its behavior.
Forward sweeps, and other forms of internally generated sequenc-
es in the hippocampus, have other roles too, besides those consid-
ered here (Diba and Buzsa´ki 2007; Foster andWilson 2007; Dragoi
and Tonegawa 2011; van der Meer and Redish 2010; Pfeiffer and
Foster 2013; Wikenheiser and Redish 2013; Pezzulo et al. 2014).
For example, trajectories can be replayed when the animal is at
rest or asleep, possibly supporting a form of memory consolida-
tion or self-training with simulated rather than real experience
(Sutton 1990). The role of sleep and dreaming has been consid-
ered in terms of model optimization and complexity minimiza-
tion under free energy formulations (Hobson and Friston 2012).
In our model, self-training might be used to speed up learning,
thus permitting more efficient reduction of residual uncertainty
(e.g., about the context) andhabitization. Furthermore, internally
generated dynamics can support forms of spatial planning (Penny
et al. 2013; Pfeiffer and Foster 2013) as well as counterfactual
thinking about the value of “the path not chosen” (Steiner and
Redish 2014). Incorporating all these functions in this framework
is an open objective for future research.
Our model addresses only the issue of “when” (or in which
conditions) VTE should be executed, not “where” it should be di-
rected (e.g., to future locations or backward to past locations, see
Steiner and Redish 2014). However, the same logic of our model
can be applied to the “where” question. Learning a model of
task contingencies—for example, the location where a reward is
usually located and the path required to reach it—allows the ani-
mal to direct the forward sweeps to the most informative areas, or
areas where the most valued information might be found. Given
that the hippocampus is widely assumed to encode spatial-
contextual contingencies necessary to solve navigation problems
(O’keefe and Nadel 1978), this mechanism might give hippo-
campal sweeps their directionality; see Friston et al. (2012a)
for an example of a mechanism permitting to sample from the
most informative parts of the environment.
In discussing the exploration–exploitation dilemma, we
made an analogy between internal and external exploration (or
search) processes, the former corresponding to a cognitive form
of search (here, corresponding to episodic memory or episodic fu-
ture thinking, Schacter and Addis 2007; Schacter et al. 2012); and
the latter corresponding to an overt exploratory behavior, as when
an animal explores an unknown or less-known branch of a maze.
This analogy is based on the idea that search processes in the brain
and in the external environment might be formally similar
(Pezzulo et al. 2013; Hills et al. 2015; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016).
First, common computational principles of information sampling
might underlie both internal and external forms of exploration or
search. Second, an exploration–exploitation dilemma might be
intrinsic in both the decision to “stop and think” (e.g., vicarious
trial and error) versus “take action immediately,” which we ad-
dressed in this article, and the decision to “explore a new option”
versus “exploit the (best) known option,” which is the most tradi-
tional formulation of the dilemma. In Active Inference, these for-
mal similarities are apparent because all forms of exploration
ultimately depend on epistemic value—ormore precisely, the bal-
ance between extrinsic and epistemic value—and the samemech-
anisms are in play when epistemic actions correspond to a
memory (or prospection) process, as in the simulations presented
here, or to the retrieval of cues in the external environment
through overt exploration, as shown in Friston et al. (2015).
At the computational level, there are various ways to balance
real (extrinsic) and epistemic actions. Some computational mod-
els (e.g., “e-greedy”) sidestep the problem by selecting random
actions with a (usually small) probability. In other models, explo-
ration is guided by expected value; for example, in the “softmax”
rule, the actions’ relative expected values determine the probabil-
ity of selecting a (suboptimal) exploratory action. However, in
these schemes, exploratory actions are not necessarily directed to-
ward the most informative outcomes. Another strategy is putting
a premium on actions that bring new (and useful) information;
for example, assigning an “exploration bonus” to actions whose
consequences are uncertain (Dayan and Sejnowski 1996) or con-
sidering in the choice the so-called “value of information” (VoI)
(Howard 1966; Keramati et al. 2011; Pezzulo et al. 2013). Similarly,
the scheme presented here assigns epistemic actions an explicit
value that can be directly used to trade off policies that include
or not include exploratory components (see Equation 1). In this
scheme, the amount of exploration required for a given choice
is itself optimized by appealing to the (normative) perspective
of free energy minimization (Friston et al. 2015), which thus sub-
sumes the calculations of information value. Furthermore, in this
scheme the epistemic value of a given exploratory action can be
quantified (under certain assumptions, e.g., about the prior belief
of an animal) and compared against extrinsic value. This might
permit designing experiments that directly test the trade-offs be-
tween exploration and exploitation, which are currently incom-
pletely known (Daw et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2007).
Conclusions
Howdo animals balance deliberate andhabitual choice strategies?
Here, we have shown that this balance is mandated by different
statistics of the environment and different prior beliefs enter-
tained by the agent; in particular, by the balance of extrinsic
and epistemic value. When task contingencies are uncertain or
behavior needs to be flexible, epistemic actions (exploration)
should be preferred; when instead the environment unambigu-
ously specifies the best policy, behavior can be habitized (exploi-
tation). Exploitative behavior emerges also when reward is
plentiful—an idea that resonates well with classical foraging the-
ories such as the Marginal Value Theorem. Here, we have shown
context sensitive balance of deliberate and habitual choice strate-
gies can be explained in a simple and principled way by Active
Inference: namely, the maximization of expected model evi-
dence, which comprises both extrinsic and epistemic value. We
have applied this normative account to vicarious trial and error
(VTE) behavior and its neurophysiological underpinnings in ro-
dent spatial decisions.
Materials and Methods
Active inference
This section describes Active Inference, in which inference and
behavior are seen as consequences of minimizing a variational
free energy bound on surprise or, equivalently, maximizing
Bayesian model evidence (Friston 2010).
Notation: we use conventional notation, where the para-
meters of categorical distributions over discrete states
s [ S [ {1, . . . , J} are denoted by J × 1 vectors of expectations
_
s [ [0,1], while the ≏ notation denotes sequences of variables
over time. The entropy of a probability distribution
P(a) = Pr(A = a) will be denoted by H(A) = H[P(a)] = EP(a)]
[− lnP(a)] and the relative entropy by the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
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divergence D[Q(a)||P(a)] = EQ(a)[lnQ(a) − lnP(a)]. The dot nota-
tion denotes A · B = ATB.
Definition: Active inference rests on the tuple
(P,Q,R, S,A,U,V):
† A finite set of observations V
† A finite set of actions A
† A finite set of hidden states S
† A finite set of control states U
† A generative process over observations o˜ [ V, hidden states
s˜ [ S and action a˜ [ A R(o˜, s˜, a˜) = Pr({o0,N, ot} = o˜, s0,N, st}
= o˜, s˜, {a0,N, at−1} = a˜).
† A generative model over observations o˜ [ V, hidden s˜ [ S and
control u˜ [ U states P(o˜, s˜, u˜|m) = Pr({o0, . . . , oT } = o˜, {s0, . . . ,
P(sT } = s˜, {ut , . . . , uT } = u˜), with parameters u.
† An approximate posterior over hidden and control states such
that Q(s˜, u˜) = Pr({s0,N, sT } = s˜, {ut ,N,uT } = u˜) with parame-
ters or expectations (
_
s,
_
p), wherep [ {1, . . . ,K} is a policy that in-
dexes a sequence of control states (u˜|p) = (ut ,N, uT |p).
Remarks: the generative process describes transitions among hid-
den states that depend upon action, where hidden states generate
outcomes that the agent observes. Actions are sampled from ap-
proximate posterior beliefs about control states based on the
agent’s generative model (denoted by m) of the generative pro-
cess. Approximate posterior beliefs about states are encoded by ex-
pectations. Note that in this formulation there is a distinction
between actions (that are part of a generative process) and control
states (that are part of the generative model). This distinction al-
lows actions to be sampled fromposterior beliefs about control, ef-
fectively converting an optimal control problem into an optimal
inference problem (Attias 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint 2012;
Kappen et al. 2012; Solway and Botvinick 2012; Donnarumma
et al. 2016). Furthermore, note that (unlike the generative process)
the generative model includes beliefs about future states.
To couple the agent to its environment, one has to specify
how its expectations depend upon observations and how its
action depends upon expectations. In discrete formulations, ex-
pectations minimize variational free energy and the ensuing ex-
pectations of control states prescribe action at the current time t:
(
_
s ∗,
_
p ∗) = argminF(o˜,
_
s,
_
p)
Pr(at = ut ) = Q(ut |
_
p∗)
F(o˜,
_
s,
_
p) = EQ [− lnP(o˜, s˜, u˜|m)] −H[Q(s˜, u˜)]
= − lnP(o˜|m) +D[Q(s˜, u˜)||P(s˜, u˜|o˜)].
(2)
In brief, at each choice point, the agent figures outwhich states are
most likely by optimizing its expectations with respect to varia-
tional free energy (using the generative model). After optimizing
its posterior beliefs, an action is sampled from the posterior mar-
ginal over control states. Given this action, the environment gen-
erates a new observation (using the generative process) and a new
cycle starts.
The first expression for free energy in Equation 2 shows that it
is an expected energy, under the generative model, minus the en-
tropy of the approximate posterior. This expression can be rear-
ranged to give the second expression, which shows that free
energy is an upper bound on the negative logarithm of Bayesian
model evidence − lnP(o˜|m), also known as surprisal (or surprise).
This is because the divergence term cannot be less than zero (Beal
2003). Therefore, minimizing free energy corresponds to mini-
mizing the divergence between the approximate and true posteri-
or. This formalizes the notion of approximate Bayesian inference
in psychology and machine learning (Helmholtz 1866; Dayan
et al. 1995; Dayan and Hinton 1997).
However, here the objective is not simply to infer hidden
states but to actively sample, by selecting an appropriate sequence
of actions, outcomes that minimize free energy—or in other
words, for an agent, to take action that leads to a small number
of preferred outcomes (goals). In Active Inference, this corre-
sponds to the fact that agents minimize surprisal, while a priori
expecting to sample preferred outcomes (goals).
The generativemodel includes the agent’s prior belief, which
can be decomposed into: a likelihood over outcomes, a prior over
state transitions and the prior over control states. These corre-
spond to the threemarginal distributions of the generativemodel:
P(o˜, s˜, u˜|m) = P(o˜|s˜)P(s˜|u˜)P(u˜|m). Crucially, the only self-consistent
prior belief an agent can entertain is that control states will min-
imize free energy, i.e., that it will achieve its goals. One can express
this formally by assuming a Boltzmann form for the prior over
control states based on the path integral of expected free energy
from the current to the final state (cf., Hamilton’s principle of least
action). As sequences of control states correspond to policies, we
will express this in terms of the quality Q (aka value or negative
free energy) of a policy
Q(u˜|p) := Q(p) :
lnP(u˜|g) = g ·Q(p) = g · (Q t+1(p) +N+QT (p))
Qt(p) = EQ(ot,st |p)[lnP(ot, st|p)] +H[Q(st|p)].
(3)
Heuristically, this means that agents believe they will pursue pol-
icies that lead to their goals (ormore formally, minimize expected
free energy in the long run and—because “unsurprising” out-
comes correspond to the agent’s goals—implicitly minimize their
surprise about those outcomes). Note that the expected free ener-
gy is the free energy of current beliefs about hidden states in the
future (i.e., the beliefs that an agent entertains while planning),
not the free energy of future beliefs. More formally, the expected
free energy (negative value) is the energy of counterfactual out-
comes and their causes expected under their posterior predictive
distribution minus the entropy of the posterior predictive distri-
bution over hidden states. The posterior predictive distributions
are distributions over future states expected under the (approxi-
mate) posterior distribution: Q(ot, st|p) = EQ(st )[P(ot, st|st ,p)]. In
this setup, g [ u plays the role of a sensitivity or inverse tempera-
ture parameter that corresponds to the precision of, or confidence,
in prior beliefs about behavior, and influences action selection
(the Softmax rule) so that policy selection becomes more deter-
ministic with increased confidence.
Rearranging the expression for expected value above reveals
two intuitive terms; namely, extrinsic and epistemic value.
Qt(p) = EQ(ot,st |p)[lnP(ot, st|p) − lnQ(st|p)]
= EQ(ot,st |p)[lnQ(st|ot,p) + lnP(ot|m) − lnQ(st|p)]
= EQ(ot |p)[lnP(ot|m)]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Extrinsic value
+EQ(ot |p)[D[Q(st|ot,p)||Q(st|p)]]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Epistemicvalue
.
(4)
Here, the generative model of future states P(ot, st|p = Q(st|ot,p))
(ot|m) comprises the predictive posterior and prior beliefs about
counterfactual outcomes that determine extrinsic value. Extrinsic
value is the negative cost or utility C(ot|m) = lnP(ot|m) of an out-
come expected under its posterior predictive distribution. This
generativemodelmeans that the agent considers costly outcomes
surprising (in the technical sense of being not “compatible” with
prior beliefs, which—essentially—encode goals), irrespective of
the policy in question (that is, the agent believes all unsurprising
policies will lead to the same preferred outcomes that represent
the agent’s goals).
Under this (predictive) generativemodel, the quality of a pol-
icy can be expressed in terms of extrinsic and epistemic value:
Extrinsic value: this is the expected utility of future outcomes
(c.f., reward) expected under the posterior predictive distribution.
Thismeans that agents (believe they) willmaximize expected util-
ity to ensure preferred (low cost) outcomes. Technically, the pre-
ferred outcomes are expressed as a probability distribution over
the agent’s observations (not states). Of note, these probabilities
are normalized—so that it is their relative and not their absolute
value that is most meaningful.
Active Inference and vicarious trial and error
www.learnmem.org 336 Learning & Memory
 Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press on February 14, 2017 - Published by learnmem.cshlp.orgDownloaded from 
Theminimization of the distance between expected and pre-
ferred outcomes can be seen more clearly when hidden states are
observed unambiguously. In this special case, St ¼ Ot and the val-
ue of a policy reduces to the (negative) Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence:
Qt(p) = EQ(ot |p)[lnP(ot|m)]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Extrinsic value
+ H[Q(ot|p)]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
Epistemic value
= −DKL[Q(ot|p)||P(ot|m)]
︸NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︷︷NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe︸
KLddivergence
. (5)
Epistemic value: epistemic value is the expected information gain
under predicted outcomes. In other words, it reports the reduc-
tion in uncertainty about hidden states afforded by observations.
Because the KL divergence (or information gain) cannot be less
than zero, the minimum information gain obtains when the pos-
terior predictive distribution is not informed by a new observa-
tion. Heuristically, this means valuable policies will search out
observations, cues or “signs” that resolve uncertainty about the
state of the world (e.g., in this context, retrieving from memory
past episodes or simulating them, in order to resolve uncertainty
about the hidden location of food).
As discussed earlier, expected free energy is a linear mixture
of epistemic and extrinsic value. This implies that, as illustrated
by our simulations, the balance between extrinsic value (of the
rewards to be collected) and epistemic value (of the possible states
to be visited) is context dependent. When accurate state estima-
tion is required to secure a reward, it is likely that epistemic value
dominates policy selection. On the contrary, extrinsic value will
likely dominate policy selection in at least two occasions. First,
when there is no posterior uncertainty and the agent is confident
about the state of the world, because essentially there can be no
further information gain and epistemic value will be the same
for all policies. In this case, exploration is not necessary and
behavior can be habitized. Second, when reward is plentiful and
the agent can select high-value policies without disambiguating
its state—hence, even in this case, exploratory actions are super-
fluous and policies including them will not be selected. In sum,
in this model, it is the relative weight of epistemic and extrinsic
value that promotes or prevents exploration, in both its overt
and covert (VTE) forms.
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